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2. Sam Scamper, a resident of North Dakota, orally agreed on July 7, 1957 to sell to 
Sid Searcher, a resident of North Dakota, one hundred shares of stock in the Eureka 
Uranium Mine. The contract was entered into in North Dakota at a time when both 
parties were residents thereof. At that time the stock was selling across the . 
counter for $105 a share and Searcl1er promised to pay Scamper $105.50 a share at the 
time of delivery on July 15, 1957. Although Searcher made tender of the purchase 
price, Scamper refused to deliver the stock, claiming that he had changed his mind 
' and had decided to leave for Virginia and take up his domicile in that State. Is 
January of 1959, the stock had a market value of $115.25. From time to time Searcher 
wrote to Scamper, demanding that the stock be delivered to him, but Scamper ignored 
hls letters. However, when Eureka, in January, 1959, was awarded valuable uranium 
rights by the United States government, its stock soared to $195 a share. Searcher 
sued Scamper in Virginia to recover damages .for breach of the contract. Assume that 
the State of North Dakota has a orie-year statute of limitations for actions on all 
• contracts. Scamper consults you and inquires whether Searcher may recover. 
What would you advise? 
(CONFLICTS)! would advise Scamper that Searcher cannot recover. In the absence of 
statute the law of the forum governs as to procedural matters, but V#B-23 reads, 1 
"Upon a contract which was made and was to be performed in another state or country 
by a person who then resided therein, no action shall be maintained after the right 
of action thereon is barred either by the laws of such state or country or of this 
State". See note to 1 on p.l of Conflict of Laws in these Notes. 
7) "'S q . 
10. Fran Farley and her husband, both domiciled in the State of New York, were law-
fully married in that State. The husband later obtained an absolute divorce from 
Fran in New York in which cause Fran was personally before the Court, and the decree 
of divorce aJs o lawfully provided that Fran was forbidden to marry again, except by 
leave of the New York Court. 
Fran then established legal domicile in Virginia and on May 1, 1959, she entered 
into a marriage ceremony with Sam Secund, also a Virginia domiciliary. Secund had 
been granted an absolute divorce from his first wife by decree of the Virginia 
Court entered on January 5,1959, on the ground that before that marriage, she had 
been convicted of an infamous offense, of which he had no knowledge. Fran neither 
received nor sought permission from the New York Court to remarry. 
Secund and Fran soon found that their marriage was likewise an unhappy one and 
Secund instituted a chancery suit against Fran for annulment of their marriage on 
the grounds that (l)their marriage was a nullity because of the New York Court~s 
prohibition against remarriage by Fran; and (2) their marriage was a nullity becaus~ 
it had been entered into prior to the expiration of the statutory waiting period in 
Virginia. 
How should the Court rule on grounds (1) and (2) of Secund 1s Bill of Complaint? 
(CONFLICT OF LAWS)(Domestic Relations) (1) The New York Decree forbidding Fran's 
remarriage is penal in nature and has no extra-territorial effect. Virginia has the 
right to determine the matrimonial status of its own citizens. So the court should 
rule that ground (l)is no cause for ·annulment. (2) The Virginia four month's/ pro-
hibition applies only to divorces for reasons arising after marriage. Those granted 
for reasons arising before marriage are really annulments despite the fact they are 
designated by statute as grounds for divorce. So the court should also rule that 
this ground is ' no reason to grant Secund an annulment • 
·::r l, () 
2. Motorist of Richmond owned a Cadillac sedan sold to him by Vendor of Richmond by 
means o~ a conditional sales contract to secure payment of $4,000, which contract 
was duJ.y recorded on the certificate of title. Son of Motorist, wishing to fish :j..n 
Canada, and without the knowledge of Vendor, borrowed his father's Cadillac to make 
the trip. Motorist and Son agreed that Son was to be solely responsible for any 
accident. While passing through New York State, the most practicable route to Canada, 
Son negligently struck and seriously injured Pedestrian, who immediately sued out 
an attachment against the Cadillac e.nd instituted an action against Son and Motorist 
for $50,000 damages. 
The New York law requires all conditional sales contracts on automobiles to be 
recorded with its Motor Vehicle Department in order to be valid as to third parties. 
The New York law also provides that. one lending his car to another is liable for 
damages done by such other per son, ~ut in Virginia he is not liable. 
(A) Vendor intarveneci in the attc..chment and claimed his debt as superior thereto. 
Is this claim sound? 
(b) Motorist defended on the grounds ·t.hat the New York lau(l)as to the owner's 
liability for damages did not apply; and(2)was uncons1.itutional as depriving him of 
due process of law and the equal protection of the l aw. How ought each of these 
defenses be decided? · 
(CONFLICTS--Constitutional Law) (A) Yes •. Vendor has done everything he was able to 
do ,in Virginia where the sale took place, and the car did not acquire a New York 
situs by merely being driven in or through New York. 
(B)(l) The New York rule as to damages applies. The tort was committed in New York 
a nd the law of the place where the tort was committed determines Motorist's personal 
liability. (2) The law i s constitutional. It applies to all cars being driven in 
New York so Motorist has equal benefits and burdens. See c89 U.S.253. 
i0 lt.· 0 
2.1Renpecked and Love-Bird, residents of Virginia, entered into a separation agree-
ment which, after settling their property rights, contained the following clause: 
"Love-Bird agrees to proceed forthwith to effect legal proceedings in Virginia or 
elsewhere to procure a legal termination of the marriage relation heretofore exist-
ing 'between the parties." 
Subsequently, Love-Bird instituted a suit for divorce in Nevada, in which suit 
Henpecked appeared by counsel and filed an answer. A factual finding of bona fide 
residence of Love-Bird in Nevada was had and she was granted a divorce. ~above 
agreement was ratified, approved and made a part of the court's decree. · 
Differences have now arisen between Henpecked and Love-Bird with respect to their 
rights in certain real estate in Pittsylvania County, Virginia; said property having 
been included in the above-mentioned agreement. 
Henpecked consults you as an attorney and wants to know whether he can have the 
portion of the divorce decree settling their property rights declared null and void 
by a Virginia court on the ground that the agreement which incorporated the property 
rights facilitated divorce and was unenforceable. What would you advise? 
(CONFLICTS) I would advise that since there has been a judicial finding that there 
was a bona fide residence of Love-Bird in Nevada and since Henpecked appeared in that. 
case Vrrgfnla must, giv~ full faith a nd credit to the Nevada decree as the void 
contract is merged into a valid decree. Virginia's public policy must yield to 
federal constitutional requirements. See 196 Va.ll7 on p.l221 of the cases on 
domestic relations in these notes. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
, t' I 
2} Bert Nuckols is a travelling salesman for a large corporation and has resided in 
the City of Roanoke for the past several years. In July of 1958, while on one of his 
mid-western tours, Nuckols was in Omaha, Nebraska, with nothing to do over the week-
end. He telephoned his friend Harry Handsome and invited Handsome to drive with him 
as his guest on a social visit to Lincoln,Nebraska. The invitation was accepted • 
While Nuckols was driving on the trip, an automobile without warning suddenly pulled 
out of a side road, collided with t.he automobile of Nuckols and caused injury to 
Handsome. After making certain that Handsome was receiving proper medical care, 
Nuckols returned to Roanoke. To the great surprise of Nuckols, on June 19, 196l,he 
was sued in the Circuit Court of the City of Roanoke by Handsome who sought $20,000 
in damages as a result of the accident. Nuckols now seeks. _your advice. 
Assuming that the law of Nebraska makes the operator of a motor vehicle an insurer 
of the safety of his guest passengers, and that such law further provides that an 
action for personal injury may be brought at any time within three years after the 
cause of action accrues, what defenses, i-f any, are available to Nuckols? 
(CONFLICTS) Assuming that the phrase "such law" refers to the general law of Nebras-
ka with respect to claims for personal injuries of all sorts, then the Nebraska 
statute of limitations is procedural. Matters of procedo.re are determined by the 
law of the forum, so Nuckols has the defense of the Virginia two year statute of 
limitations on action for personal injuries when sued in Virginia. See 200 Va. 173 
in the Conflicts cases of these notes. 
2P1ied Heart and Sharp Spade, while in Virginia, entered into a gambling contract. 
Spade did not pay the gambling debt when :tt was due, and Hee..rt, sued Spade in the 
state in which Spade was a resident to r ecover the amount due under the contract. 
The court of Spade's state m.farded j'.ldgment to Hea:r·t on the contract. Later Spade 
moved to Virginia and acquired some valuable real est ate, whe~eupon Heart sued 
Spade in Virginia on the judgment that had been obtained il. Spade's former state. 
Spade defends upon the ground that the former judgment was entered upon a claim un .. 
enforceable in Virginia, and t hat the Virgi nia court should not a'"ard judgment to 
Heart. Assume that a gambling contract is void in Virgini a. How should the Virginia 
court rule? 
(CO!IJFLICTS) The Court should rule in favor of Heart. While the judgment may be 
wrong it is not void. It was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction •. The void 
contract rias merged into a valid judgment and Heaz·t' s suit i s on the valid judgment 
which the Virgini a. Courts must re~og~ize under the fuJ . l faith and credit clause of 
the fede:ral Constitut,iono See Restatement Conflict. of Laws #446 and Illustration 1. 
Page 570. 1 Dec.l962. 
1. wayfarer, going along a public road in Lee County, Va., was attacked by McCoy,who 
would have killed him unless prevepted by the immediate interposition of some super-
i or force. Martin, out deerhunting, saw the situation and shot at McCoy in an attempt 
to prevent the murder, but unfort~ately McCoy moved just as the shot was fired and 
the bullet missed him and wounded H~tfield, who, unknown to Martin, was on a deer 
stand across the State line in Kent~eky. 
Assume that by Virginia law Mart~~ was justified in shooting at McCoy, but under 
Kentucky law he was not. Is Martin . liable to Hatfield for damages? 
(CONFLICTS) No. While it is ordinarily wrong to shoot another intentionally, Martin's 
conduct was privileged in Virginia) as an exception to the general rule that such 
conduct is tortious. Conflicts Restttement #382(2)reads, "A person who acts pursuant 
~ a privilege conferred by the law ;of the place of acting will not be held liable 
for the results of his act in anoth~r state." See Illustration 4 and comment C. Note: 
There appears to be no authority on this point one way or another either for or 
against the Restatement view so that answers based on the theory that Martin con-
structively followed the bullet, or that the law of the State where the act took 
effect applied, are not necessarily wrong. 
2.1i~n Potter instituted a chancery suit in the Circuit Court of Lee County 
against Simon Lester, seeking to compel Lester to specifically perform an alleged 
contract 'between them whereby he had contracted to sell to Susan the tract of lam 
known as "Tri-State Acres.M Lester answered, and the cause came on for hearing be• 
fore the chancellor ore tenus. Suaan offered proof that Lester had inherited "Tri-
State Acres" from his-fate father; that the property contained 1,000 acres, most of 
which lay in Lee County, Virginia, but a few acres of which lay in Bell County, Ky., 
and a few lay in Claiborne County, Tennessee; and she introduced into evidence a 
written contract by which Lester agreed to sell the same to her for a consideration 
specified therein. She testified that on the date provided in the contract for the 
settlement she had tendered the purchase price to Lester, but that he had refused 
to sell, giving as his reason that he had' changed his mind. 
Lester then proved that the law of Kentucky provided for transfer of land only by 
the grantor and grantee going on the land together and jointly declaring transfer of 
the title thereto. He further proved that the applicable law of Tennessee for con-
veyancing was the same as that in Virginia. Conceding that he had no defense to the 
suit as it pertained to the Virginia land, Lester urged the court to dismiss the 
bill with respect to the Kentucky and Tennessee acreage. 
Should the court specifically enforce the contract as to(a)the Tennessee land, 
(b) the Kentucky land? 
(CONFLICTS)(a) The court should specifically enforce the contract as to the Tennessee 
land since equity in this case acts in personam and has jurisdiction over the de-
fendant.(b) But it should refuse that remedy as to the Kentucky land as it will not 
generally compel anyone to do an act in another state, nor should it enter a decree 
it cannot enforc.e. 
In the case of the Tennessee land a deed executed in Virginia can pass title to 
land in Tennessee, but no act done in Virginia can pass title to the Kentucky land. 
See Restatement(Conflict of Laws) ##9l.dcomment B) and 97. 
2 JI~tand, an Illinois citizen, was injured in Bath Co~ty, Va., by a motorist named 
Titus, a citizen of Kentucky. Brand brought an action in Kentucky against Titus for 
the recovery of damages for his personal injuries. The action was instituted in 
Kentucky more than one year after the accident and the statute of limitations for 
such action in Kentucky was one year. Upon a plea of the statute of limitations 
filed by Titus, the action was dismissed. Subsequently, but within two years from 
the date of the accident, an aotion was instituted by Brand against Titus, in the 
Circuit Court of Bath County to recover damages for his injuries. Titus filed a 
plea of res adjudicat~. How should the Virginia court rule on the plea? 
(CONFLICTS) The plea of res adjudicata is not good. The Kentucky Court did not pass 
on the merits of the case but only held that it could not be m~.intained in Kentuck:r 
because of a Kentucky procedural statute. Restatement of the Law of Judgments #49 ~ 
10 ~~ the law of one of the St.ates of · the Union(herein referred to aa State X), a 
0 poration is forbidden to hold an interest in land not actually used for corporate ~~poses. By the law of another State of the Union(herein referred to as State Y), 
a corporation may hold for any purpose land valued at less th<m $1,000,000, but may 
not for any purpose hold land of a greater value •. Blue Sky~ Inc., a corporation of 
~tate x but domesticated in State Y, holds land ~n State Y valued at $600,000, and 
~ses this land for the v~rposes for which it is chartered. The corporation has an ~pportunity to buy additional land in Stat~ Y valued at $25?,0~0. The directors 
of the corporation consult you .as to. the r1ght of the_corpora~1on to make the 
purehase, advising that the corporat.lon c~nnot use tl:11B land 1n the performance of 
its corporate purposes, but they are conf1dent that 1t can hold the property for 
three or four years and then sell it at a substantial profit. How would you advise 
the direotors? . . (CONFLICTS) I would advise the directors that wh1le. the ~orporat1on had t~e poweJ 
t t he land in State Y(as the law of the state 1n whH': h the land is a1tuated 0 
own ) . t is not privileged to do so under its charter and hence might run the ~~:~r~ ~osing its State X corporate rights and privileges if it made the purchase. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
2-~l-~utus Appleseed is a resident of Bristol, Tennessee. On the evening of Nov.l4, 
1963, his 17 year old son Johnny asked permission to use the family automobile so •. 
that he could take his date Sarah Cling, who lived in nearby Kingsport,Tennessee, to 
a dance to be held in Gate City, Virginia. Brutus gave his permission and Johnny got 
in the automobile, drove to Kingsport where he picked up Sarah and proceeded on 
toward Gate City. On entering Gate City, Johnny drove through a partly concealed 
stop sign and collided with a passing automobile, such collision causing Sarah to 
suffer a broken arm. Sarah has now brought an action against Brutus Appleseed in a 
proper court of Bristol, Tennessee, alleging that Johnny was guilty of ordinary 
negligence which caused her injury, that Brutus is liable to her as the owner of the 
family automobile, and seeking damages of $5000. 
In defense of the action, Brutus pleads (a)that while Tennessee recognizes the 
family purpose doctrine, such doctrine is not recognized in Virginia where the 
accident occurred, and (b) that while Tennessee recognizes that a host driver is li& 
able to his guest passenger for only ordinary negligence, yet in Virginia where the 
accident occurred gross negligence must be shown. Are these defenses good? 
' (CONFLICTS) The defenses are good. They involve matters of the substantive law of 
torts. As to such matters the law of the place where the alleged tort took place 
governs. See Restatement Conflict~, - #378, /#384, #387. Note: ~n answer stating that 
Tennessee Law would apply on the theory that all contacts involved Tennessee persons 
has support of the revised Restatement and some recent non-Virginia decisions. 
Pb~ . 2 Go~dbidder Construction Corporation, a Virginia e::orporat,ion, was engaged in con-
struotion work in Tennessee purfmant to c;, wntract with 0-;..-n f;:c. DuriP..g the progress 
of the work~ Svurgrv.pes Construction Company, a ViJ.·ginia cm:poration with its 
pl~incipal office in Richmond, \vhL:h had bc;en an unsucce3sful bidder on the job 
committed certain tortious acts on t.he j ob site which direr.:tly interfered with' 
Goodbidder's completion of its contract with a resultant loss to Goodbidder. 
Goodbidder sued Sourgrape.s in the Circuit Court of t he City of Richmond, and the 
evid~me<-' established the Uabih ty uf SourgrapeEJ. Among other damages, Good bidder 
claimed out,-of-poc.ket expenses for wages paid certain workers v1ho could only stand 
by du . '!'ing the trouble and not wos:k, and Goodbidder abo claimed punitive damages. 
Under the facts presented, Tennessee l 2.w would allow :-eeov-ery of the "paid 1v-age" 
claim but Virginia law would not_., and Virginia lc>.w would allow recovery of 
punitive damages but, Tenness1-3e la1r1 would noiJ. 
In this action, it1 Goodbidder entitlBd to recover(l)the "paid wage" claim a!ld 
(2) the punitive damage claiJ'l? 
(CONFLICTS) Either of the two answers b8bw:(l)Sinee Gcod.bidder is suing for damages 
for a tort committed in Tennessee and oince the law as to the measure thereof is 
substantive rather than procedural th8 Virgin~~a. Court should apply Termessee Law 
, and allow a recovE~ry of hhe )1pc:dd wage" _claim but not fo:.· punitive damagos. 
Restatement Conflicts #f/~12 and 421, or {2)In accordance with recent thinking the 
law of the state where tile major contaets are involved should apply. Here we have 
a Virginia plaintiff, a Virginia defendant, and a Virginj.a court ~ No one in 
Tennessee is affected. Hence Virginia law is applicable and Goodbidder can recover 
punitive damages but not the ttpa:!.d wage11 claim • 
f: .~---
2 .. kmbitious and Homebody were married and lived very happily i n Louisville, Ky., 
until Glamorous cast her sultry eyes in the direotion of Ambitious. At first 
Ambitious trod the path of rectitude, but finally succtunbed to the enticements of 
Glamorous and left with her for Richmond, Virginia, where, strange to say, Glamorous 
owned extensive properties. Homebody consults you as to her right to sue Glamorous 
for alienating her husband's affections. Upon looking into the matter you discover 
that the only loca.lity in which you can obtain service of process on Glamorous is 
Richmond, Virginia. 
Assume that by statute Virginia, 11 in recognition of the cha.nging social and legal 
status of women, and of the broad social trend of opinion, and finding that the 
abolition of such actions would tend to improve the public morals and serve the best 
interests of the State," had abolished such acti ons. Also assume that such actions 
are still recognized by the laws of Kentucky, / ' How ought you to advise Homebody? 
(CONFLICTS) She should be advised that a Virgini a court 1,rill refuse any remedy which 
it is against the public policy of this Commonwealth to r ecognize. A Kentucky plain-
tiff :~~houJ.d not have a greater right than a Virginia plaintiff in Virginia courts. 
See 136 P.2d 116 and 88 Va.971. What Virginia's public policy is, is substantive 
law, and not a mere matter of procedure. 
6C5u Section 1, Dec.l,l965. 1~ ~dna and Eddi?, residents of Virginia, decided to go their separate ways after 
r:av·~?g been marr~ed 10 years. Not bothering about a divorce, Edna moved to an ad-
JOimng county in Virginia, where she lived in adultery with another man. Eddie 
waR thereafter killed in an automobile accident in North Carolina. The driver of the 
other vehicle, Donald, was also a resident of Virginia • 
. An action was instituted in a proper court in Virginia by the personal representa-
t~ve of Eddie's estate against Donald under the North Carolina death-by-w~ongful a~t 
statute. Donald defended on the ground inter alia that the action could not be 
maintained because the North Carolina sta~te specifically provided that a spouse 
living in adultery could not receive or share in the recovery under the death-by-
wrongful-act statute. Moreover, under the North Carolina statute there were no 
other persons who could receive the recovery in the instant case. The V:trginla 
death-by-wrongful-act statute does not preclude a widow living in adultery from 
sharing in a recovery. Should the defense be sustaL1<;d'! 
(CONFLICTS) Yes, the defens ;~ is valid. Edna would have :10 rights but for the 
statute and the statute(North Carolina Death by Wrongful Act Statute) gives her 
none. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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9;)!t Jaunary of 1960, Miles Stone, an elderly widower of the City ~f Fredericksburg, 
moved from that City to Charleston, South Carolina where he established his domicile. 
During the latter part of 1965, Stone married Sarah Stevens, a young lady of 
Charleston. Stone died during the month of April, 1966, and there was found among 
his effects a paper written entirely in his own handwriting, and reading as follows: 
0 December 25, 1965 
0 I hereby devise and bequeath my farm known as Redacre lying outside the 
City of Fredericksburg, Virginia, and all household furniture stored 
thereon to my beloved wife Sarah. All the rest and residue of my 
property I devise and bequeath to my son Herman, my only child. 
"Witness my hand and seal. 
nMiles Stone(Seal)tt 
A controversy has arisen between Sarah and Herman in a suit in the Circuit Court of 
Spottsylvania County, Virginia, wherein each claims the right to receive both Red-
acre and the household furniture stored there. Assuming that the law of South 
Carolina does not recognize a holographic will as a valid testamentary instrument, 
and that, under the intestate laws of South Carolina, children of a decedent are 
the first class entitled to receive both real and personal property, which of Sarah 
and Herman are entitled to receive both real and personal property,(a) Redacre, 
and (b) the household furniture? 
(CONFLICT OF LAWS) Realty should pass under lex situs and therefore the holographic 
will is valid so as to pass Redacre to wife, Sarah. Personalty passes under the 
laws of the domicile state at time of death and therefore the holographic will, 
invalid under South Carolina law, cannot give her the household furniture and the 
same will pass to Herman under the intestate laws of South Carolina. Restatement 
of Conflicts, #Z49, #306; Rice, 4 Call. 89; Smith, 122 Va. 341; 171 Va. 327. 
2--Coni'lic ts p" f 
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lo;fklrounge was in the salvage business in Virginia and had for sale fifty rare 
cuspidors from a famous sporting house. On October 10, he wrote Wheeler of Rome, 
Georgia, and Delk of Atlanta, Georgia, identieal letters offering for sali0to £~&h 
one twenty-five cuspidors at a stated price and advising that his offer coutaPBe~ 
by their dating and signing the letter of offer and mailing it back to Scrounge. 
Bot& Wheeler and Delk dated and signed the letters on October 12. Wheeler mailed his 
letter direct to Scrounge, and Delk sent his to his branch office in Virginia and 
Delk's agent delivered the same to Scrounge, both being received by Scrounge on 
October 14. Meanwhile, Scrounge had disposed of the cuspidors under such circum-
stances that under Georgia law, he would be liable for a breach of contract but 
under Virginia law, he would not be liable for a breach of contract. 
Is Scrounge liable to either Wheeler or Delk or to both? 
(CONFLICTS) The answer preferred is that Scrounge is liable to Wheeler as the con-
tract with Wheeler was accepted in Georgia and Georgia law governs as to the ex-
istence of a binding contract. Conversely, Scrounge would not be liable to Delk 
because Delk's acceptance took place in Va. and under Va. law he would not be liable 
Note: An answer considering the Conflict of Law Rules applicable to the place of 
performance is worthy of substantial credit. Under this approach it would appear 
that Va. was the place of performance and that Scrounge is not liable under either 
contract by reason of Va. law being applicable. 16 Am.Jur.2nd #36 & 37. 
lo.PJe?edent, a resident of Maryland, was killed in an automobile collision in 
Virginia when his car was struck by one driven by Defendant, a resident of North 
Carolina. Assume that contributory negligence is not a defense in Maryland and that 
in North Carolina it may be shown in diminution of damages only, that the action for 
wrongful death was brought in North Carolina, and that Decedent was guilty of 
negligence proximately contributing to cause the accident. 
What effect, if any, would the negligence of Decedent have on the right of 
recovery? 
(CONFLICTS) Since the place of the tort was Virginia, under traditional rules of • 
conflicts of law Virginia law would govern this case. Under Virginia law contribu-
tory negligence proximately contributing to cause an accident will act as a complete 
bar to the wrongful death claim by decedent's administrator. See Rest. #385 and 
the cases cited in 1965 supplement. 
• 
